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legislative scheme, which is to ensure equal opportunity in employment
and a discrimination-free workplace, and which is not to punish recalcitrant
employers.' Finally, the Fourth Circuit's holding is congruous with the
current use of the "plain meaning" statUnited States Supreme Court's
32
utory construction rule.1
D.

CONSUMER PROTECTION

Ferris v. Haymore
967 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1992)
The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act' 33 (Odometer
Act) provides a private federal cause of action for victims of odometer
fraud. Odometer fraud is the act of tampering with a vehicle's odometer
to reduce its milage reading and thereby increase the vehicle's ostensible
value. The Odometer Act provides a remedy of treble damages, court
costs, and attorneys fees for successful plaintiffs. The Act imposes this
liability on all transferrers with intent to defraud in the vehicle's chain of
title. Whether each defendant is individually liable under the Odometer
Act for the full damage award, or whether the liability is joint and several
among the defendants, has been the subject of opposing interpretations
of the Odometer Act. 3 4 The Fourth Circuit addressed this issue and issues
35
relating to North Carolina's state odometer law in Ferrisv. Haymore1
In Ferris, the plaintiff purchased a car from a Richmond, Virginia
auto dealer in November 1983 after the dealer assured him that the
odometer reading was accurate. After experiencing costly mechanical problems with the car, Ferris contacted the Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles
(VDMV) in December 1983. The VDMV responded in a letter dated
January 21, 1985 that Ferris might be a victim of odometer fraud. Ferris
later discovered that the car's odometer had been fraudulently turned back
approximately 40,000 miles. Ferris sued the Richmond dealer in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and settled with
the dealer for $6,000.
Ferris then brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina against five defendants linked to the

131. Sherman, 891 F.2d at 1536-42 (Tjoflat, C.J., specially concurring) (arguing that Bailey
v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506 (l1th Cir. 1988) was wrongly decided and interpreting Title VII
to protect former employees is contrary to legislative purpose)..
132. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (holding that
plain meaning rule should be conclusive except in rare cases where literal application of statute
produces result demonstrably inconsistent with intent of drafters) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
134. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing opposing interpretations of
Odometer Act).
135. 967 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1992).
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car's chain of title: Carl Simmons, Lucille Inman, Bill Inman, Dean
Haymore, and Western Surety Company (Western). Carl Simmons, Lucille
Inman, and Dean Haymore were owners of two dealerships in the car's
chain of title. Western provided surety bonds to both dealerships. Ferris
voluntarily dropped his claim against Bill Inman before trial. Before trial
Ferris also settled with Simmons for $5,000, bringing Ferris' total settlements to $11,000 before the trial against the remaining four defendants.
The district court determined that, due to the inflated price Ferris had
paid for the car and the repairs he had been forced to make as a result
of the car's unknown high milage, Ferris had suffered actual damages of
$3,712.84. Based on this finding, the court awarded Ferris treble damages
of $11,138.52 under federal law, and $11,138.52 under North Carolina
state law against Haymore and Lucille Inman. The district court then
reduced the resulting total of $22,277.04 by $11,000, the amount Ferris
had collected in prior settlements. After adding $3,090.40 in prejudgment
interest, the court awarded Ferris a final judgment of $14,317.44 against
Haymore and Lucille Inman. The district court later ordered Haymore
and Inman to pay Ferris $17,207.25 in court costs and attorneys fees. The
district court also held that Western, as surety to Haymore and Lucille
Inman, was liable to Ferris for the actual damages of $3,712.84, plus
postjudgment interest, but Western was not liable for treble damages or
costs, and attorneys fees.
Ferris appealed, arguing that Western also was liable to him for treble
damages, costs and attorneys fees, and that the reduction of his judgment
against Haymore and Lucille Inman in the amount of his pretrial settlements was improper. Western cross-appealed the district court's refusal to
grant summary judgment in its favor and the court's failure to reduce the
judgment against it by the amount of Ferris' pretrial settlements.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first
addressed Western's cross-appeal for summary judgment. Ferris' claim
against Western as surety for Haymore and Inman arose under the North
Carolina motor vehicle dealer suretyship statute, but did not arise under
the federal Odometer Act. Therefore, Ferris' claims against Western, as
well as Western's cross appeal, were purely issues of North Carolina law.
The Fourth Circuit briefly considered and rejected the first three of
Western's four arguments for summary judgment.
Western's fourth argument for summary judgment against Ferris was
that Ferris filed his action after the statute of limitations had run. Western
argued that Ferris' claim arose under its suretyship contract with the
dealer, and that the limitations period began to run when the dealer's
fraud breached that contract. Western relied on North Carolina's adherence to the common-law rule that the limitations period in a contract
action begins to run upon breach, not upon discovery of the breach.
Because Ferris brought his action more than three years after the breach
of the contract between Western and the dealer, Western argued that
Ferris did not bring his claim within the applicable three year statute of
limitations.
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To resolve the statute of limitations issue, the Fourth Circuit relied
on the North Carolina Court of Appeals' reasoning in Bernard v. Ohio
Casualty Insurance Co.136 In Bernard the court ruled that, under the
statutes governing motor vehicle surety bonds in North Carolina, the
plaintiff's cause of action against the surety accrues at the same time the
plaintiff's cause of action accrues against the surety's principal. 137 Holding
that the ruling in Bernard was directly applicable to the case at bar, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that Ferris' action against Western accrued
simultaneously with his action against Haymore and Inman. Because Ferris'
action against Haymore and Inman was an action sounding in fraud, that
cause of action did not accrue until Ferris discovered the fraud when he
received the VDMV's letter in January 1985. Accordingly, Ferris' cause
of action against Western did not accrue until January 1985. On this basis,
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Ferris' action against Western was not
time-barred, and affirmed the district court's denial of Western's motion
for summary judgment.
The Fourth Circuit next addressed Ferris' claim that Western was
liable to him for treble damages in addition to the actual damage amount
the district court awarded. To resolve this issue, the Fourth Circuit looked
to the North Carolina Supreme Court decision in Tomlinson v. Camel
City Motors, Inc.13 1 In Tomlinson, the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that when an automobile dealer had violated North Carolina's unfair
trade statute, the dealer's surety was not liable to the plaintiff for treble
damages under the statute. 13 9
As a possible exception to the rule that a dealer's surety is not liable
to the plaintiff for treble damages under the statute, the Tomlinson court
stated in dicta that trebling against the surety may be appropriate in cases
where the plaintiff had incurred losses beyond "actual damages."' 14 The
Fourth Circuit interpreted this proviso to mean that a plaintiff may, in
circumstances where the plaintiff incurred losses not normally included in
the legal calculation of "actual damages," collect damages to a maximum
of the amount of treble damages. The Fourth Circuit ruled that none of..
Ferris' claims for recovery belonged in the Tomlinson court's category of
incurred costs beyond actual damages. The Fourth Circuit accordingly
upheld the district court's ruling that Ferris was not entitled to recover
any portion of a treble damage award against Western.
Ferris also appealed the district court's denial of his claim for court
costs and attorney's fees from Western. The Fourth Circuit noted that no
North Carolina statute expressly allows for plaintiffs in Ferris' position
to recover costs and attorney's fees from sureties, and that Tomlinson did

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

339 S.E.2d
Bernard v.
408 S.E.2d
Tomlinson
Id.

20 (1986).
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 339 S.E.2d 20, 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
853 (N.C. 1991).
v. Camel City Motors, Inc., 408 S.E.2d 853, 856 (N.C. 1991).
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not address this question. In the absence of any legislative intent or
guidance from North Carolina courts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
it had no authority to impose liability for costs and attorneys fees on
Western.
Because Ferris' arguments for recovery of treble damages, costs, and
attorneys fees against Western failed, the Fourth Circuit ruled that under
North Carolina law Western was liable to Ferris only for the actual damage
amount of $3,712.84.
The Fourth Circuit then addressed Ferris' appeal of the district court's
reduction of his claim against Haymore and Inman by the $11,000 he had
received in pretrial settlements. Unlike his claim against Western, which
arose only under state law, Ferris' judgment against Haymore and Inman
was in satisfaction of both state and federal law claims. Because the state
and federal statutes differ with respect to their treatment of the liability
of separate defendants, the question of whether the reduction was proper
is more complicated than it would be under a single statute. The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that the first step in determining whether the reduction
of Ferris' claim against Haymore and Inman was proper was to determine
what proportion of the pretrial settlements Ferris received in settlement
of state law claims, and what proportion he received in settlement of
federal law claims.
The $6,000 settlement from the Richmond auto dealer was clearly in
settlement of Ferris' federal claim against the dealer, as the settlement
agreement stated this. The $5,000 settlement from Simmons was in settlement of both state and federal claims. Although the district court did not
describe the details of the agreement, the Fourth Circuit assumed that the
$5,000 represented $2,500 in settlement of the state claim and $2,500 in
settlement of the federal claim. Therefore, of the $11,000 in pretrial
settlements, Ferris received a total of $8,500 in settlement of his federal
law claim, and $2,500 in settlement of his state law claim.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the question of whether Ferris'
judgment against Haymore and Inman under the federal Odometer Act
should have been reduced by the amount he received in pretrial settlements
depended directly on whether defendants are liable separately or jointly
under the Odometer Act. Both the plain language of the Odometer Act
and its punitive purpose indicate, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, that Congress intended the liability to be separate and individual among the
defendants. The Fourth Circuit noted further that a majority of federal
courts have reached this conclusion in interpreting the Odometer Act, and
that the Sixth Circuit's contrary position was not persuasive. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that, because the Odometer Act imposes separate liability
on each defendant, the district court's reduction of Ferris' claim against
Haymore and Inman was not proper as to the $8,500 representing Ferris'
pretrial settlements of his federal claims.
In contrast to the separate liability imposed by the federal statute, the
state of North Carolina adheres to the common-law rule of "one recovery"
for each injury, even where the legislature has imposed punitive liability.
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Ferris' pretrial settlements were therefore part of his one recovery. On
this basis the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's reduction of
Ferris' judgment against Haymore and Inman by the $2,500 Ferris received
from Simmons in settlement of his state law claim.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed Western's claim that it was
entitled to a reduction of the $3,712.84 actual damage award the district
court imposed on it by the $11,000 Ferris received in pretrial settlements.
In declining to allow this reduction, the Fourth Circuit explained that
Haymore and Inman were liable to Ferris in tort, whereas Western was
liable to Ferris under its suretyship contract. Although North Carolina
law allows reduction of a tort defendant's judgment in the amount of
pretrial settlements received by a codefendant in tort, it does not entitle
a defendant in contract to reduction based on a codefendant's settlement
in tort. Western was therefore not entitled to a reduction of the judgment
against it under either federal law or North Carolina law.
In summary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings
on all issues appealed and cross-appealed, with the exception of the
reduction of Ferris' claim against Haymore and Inman by the $8,500
Ferris had previously received in settlement of his federal claims. On this
issue the Fourth Circuit ruled that the district court erred in its interpretation of the federal Odometer Act, and that the reduction was improper.
The dissent concurred with all parts of the majority opinion except
the finding that the reduction of Ferris' claim under federal law was
improper. Relying on the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the Odometer
Act in Rice v. Gustavel,14' the dissent reasoned that the language of the
Odometer Act plausibly could be read to allow only one treble damage
award for victims of odometer fraud. The dissent reasoned further that
its interpretation would be more sensible, as the majority's reading allows
plaintiffs to recover awards many times in excess of their already trebled
damages.
On the question of whether the Odometer Act imposes separate punitive liability on each defendant, the Ferris decision brings the Fourth
Circuit into line with the Fifth Circuit, 142 making the Sixth Circuit ruling
43
in Rice the minority position.
Scott v. Jones
964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992)
In 1977 Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA).' 44 In pertinent part, the FDCPA establishes venue restrictions
141. 891 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
142. Ally v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 767 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendants
under Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), are separately
and individually liable to plaintiff).
143. Rice v. Gustavel, 891 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendants are not
separately and individually liable to plaintiff under Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
144. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988).
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for legal actions filed by "debt collectors" to recover consumer debt. 4
Suits must be filed in the judicial district in which the consumer signed
the contract sued upon or where the consumer resides.1 46 A "debt collector" is defined by the FDCPA as:
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce
or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to
debts owed or due or asserted to be
collect, directly or indirectly,
47
owed or due another.
In 1986 this definition was amended to eliminate an exemption from the
definition of "debt collector" which excluded attorneys collecting debt on
behalf of, and in the name of, a client. 48 Given this relatively recent
change in an attorney's status under the FDCPA, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Scott v. Jones149 was presented, for
the first time, with the issue of whether an attorney employed by a third
party to institute legal proceedings to collect outstanding debts was a
"debt collector" within the meaning of the FDCPA.'50
The defendants in Scott, Sherwood A. Jones and his law firm, Jones
& Jones, were retained by Central Fidelity Bank (CFB) to represent CFB's
bank card division in lawsuits based upon delinquent credit card accounts.
In February 1990, Jones filed suit against the plaintiff, Matilda Scott, in
General District Court for the City of Richmond seeking to recover past
due debts owed on a bank card Scott had obtained from CFB. Scott,
however, resided in Lynchburg, Virginia. Consequently, venue in Richmond was improper under the FDCPA. Jones agreed to transfer the case
to Lynchburg General District Court, but CFB subsequently dropped the
lawsuit and forgave Scott's outstanding debt.
Scott then filed a class action lawsuit against Jones seeking the
imposition of civil liability on Jones for his violation of the venue
provisions of the FDCPA. The FDCPA authorizes such liability.' 5 ' Upon
cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Jones
was a "debt collector," the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia granted Scott's motion and ruled that Jones was a

145. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i (1988).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) (1988).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1988).
148. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692a(6)(F) (West 1982), as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (1988).
See generally Michael K. Sweig, Guidelines for Consumer Debt Collection by Attorneys Under
the 1986 Amendments to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 21 NEw ENo. L. Rsv. 697
(1985-1986) (noting repeal of attorney exemption); Jeffrey D. Friebert, Fair Debt Collections
PracticesAct, Wis. LAW., June 1990, at 15 (noting repeal of attorney exemption and informing
attorneys of potential liability under FDCPA).
149. 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992).
150. Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 315 (4th Cir. 1992).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (1988).
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"debt collector" under the FDCPA. Jones was granted an interlocutory
152
appeal by the Fourth Circuit.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. It
found that Jones satisfied both alternatives of the definition of "debt
collector" under the FDCPA. Initially, Jones's and his law firm's "principal purpose" was the collection of debts. The court noted that at least
seventy to eighty percent of his legal fees were generated in relation to
his debt collection activities.
Furthermore, the appellate court also agreed that Jones regularly
attempted to collect debt indirectly. The volume of Jones's debt collection
work established its regularity. Jones filed approximately four thousand
warrants per year between 1983 and 1987. Filing these warrants constituted
an "indirect" means of collecting debt. In reaching this conclusion, the
Scott court relied on two points. First, the court felt the conclusion it
reached was justified by what it termed a "common sense construction"
of the statutory definition. Second, the Scott court observed that in the
FDCPA, Congress chose to regulate venue as well as more traditional
debt collection activities involving direct contact of debtors.1 5 Thus,
Congress must have intended the FDCPA to include attorneys within the
definition of a debt collector. The Fourth Circuit dismissed as an artificial
distinction Jones's argument that he was engaged in the practice of law
and not debt collection. 54 Regardless of the name applied to what Jones
55
did, the principal purpose of his activities was debt collection.
Jones unsuccessfully argued two additional points. First, Jones argued
that the legislative intent of the 1986 amendment was to make attorneys
liable under the FDCPA only to the extent that other nonlawyer debt
collectors were liable. Thus, Jones's legal work would still be excluded.
The Scott court summarily dispensed with this argument, citing United
States v. Ron PairEnterprises, Inc.,56 which stated that where a statute's
language is clear, the court's only function is to enforce the statute's plain
language. 5 7 Although the court conceded that there is no absolute rule
against looking to sources such as legislative intent, the court concluded
that the statutory language was clear, and that the sources that Jones
advanced were not sufficiently probative of congressional intent to override
that express language.
Jones next argued that the court was bound by the definition which
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) adopted concerning the language

152. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) (allowing interlocutory appeals of district court orders
not otherwise appealable).
153. See Scott, 964 F.2d at 316 n.1 (defining traditional debt collection activities). Traditional
debt collection activities include such actions as dunning letters and similar types of direct contact
with debtors. Id.
154. Id. at 316.
155. Id.
156. 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
157. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
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"collection of debt" as used by the FDCPA.'5 s The FTC definition
excludes an attorney "whose practice is limited to legal activities (for
example, the filing and prosecution of lawsuits to reduce debts to judgment)." 5 9 Jones even secured a letter from an FTC staff attorney which
indicated that Jones was not a debt collector within the meaning of the
FDCPA. Even with these facts, however, the Fourth Circuit still refused
to accept the FTC definition. Citing Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,160 the court reasoned that if a statute is silent or
ambiguous as to a specific issue, then a court should defer to the reasonable
administrative interpretation of the statute.' 6' Because the court had already decided that the statutory language was clear, it would not accept
the FTC's interpretation which ran counter to the plain meaning of the
statutory language.
Only one other court of appeals decision has addressed attorneys as
debt collectors. In Crossley v. Lieberman,162 the attorney sent a letter to
the debtor demanding payment of the debt directly to the attorney. 63 The
court found that the attorney was a debt collector because the attorney
had testified in a separate case that his practice was principally centered
on debt collection. 64 The Crossley court also noted that the attorney filed
a significant number of cases for mortgage foreclosure and other collections related activity, 65 that the attorney represented three other creditors, 66 and that the attorney's relationship67 with the particular creditor in
question had been ongoing for ten years.
Jones distinguished Crossley by arguing that the attorney there had
directly contacted the debtor. The Fourth Circuit responded by admitting
a potential grounds for distinction because, in its view, the Crossley court
was not clear in its opinion whether it was the attorney's direct contact
of the debtor, or the attorney's legal activities alone, that formed the
basis for its decision. 6 Regardless of this ambiguity, however, the Fourth
Circuit found that there was nothing in Crossley to contradict its position
considered a "debt collector" on the basis of his
that an attorney can be
69
legal activities alone.

158. Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 1992).
159. Federal Trade Commission, Statements of General Policy or Interpretation, Staff
Commentary on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,102.
160. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
161. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
162. 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989).
163. Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 567 (3d Cir. 1989).
164. Id. at 570.
165. Id. at 570 n.2.

166. Id.at 570.
167. Id.; see Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D. Conn. 1990) (listing and applying
factors set out in Crossley).
168. Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 n.3 (4th Cir. 1992).
169. Id.at 317-18 n.3.
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As previously noted, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit is the only other court of appeals to consider the issue of attorneys
as debt collectors. While both the Third and the Fourth Circuits found
the attorney to be a debt collector, the factual basis relied upon by the
two courts is not clearly the same.7 0 The attorney in Crossley did not cite
to the court the same legislative intent arguments as did the attorneys in
Scott. Nor did the Scott court directly address Jones's distinction argument. Instead, it simply observed that nothing in Crossley prevented its
ruling. Thus, the potential for a future split among circuits still exists.
The significance of the Fourth Circuit's decision becomes even less
clear when compared to the approach taken by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. That court has accepted
7
the legislative intent argument that was rejected by the Fourth Circuit.' '
Other district courts have used a similar analysis.' 7 2 Scott, in comparison
to these cases, represents the broadest application of the "debt collector"
definition. Under Scott, the attorney can be considered a "debt collector"
7
exclusively on the basis of the attorney's legal activities. 1
The Scott decision has probably not ended litigation on this issue, but
simply shifted its focus. The issue courts and attorneys are now likely to
face is how significant a collection practice the attorney must possess in
order to be a debt collector. The salient facts in Scott are that Jones filed
four thousand suits each year and that those suits generated seventy to
eighty percent of his legal fees. The next logical issue is to determine the
proportion of legal fees required to make debt collection an attorney's
"principal purpose.' 7 4 Furthermore, the number of legal actions that will
75
suffice to indicate regularity under the FDCPA's definition is disputable.
The last potential target for litigation could be whether regularity will be
measured according to volume or percentage. 7 6 The Scott court did not
address any of these issues because in Jones's situation both the volume
and the percentage of business were high. The next case to consider

170. Id. (discussing confusion over basis for Crossley decision).
171. See Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137, 1142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that law firm not debt collector under FDCPA); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartel, 741 F.
Supp. 1139, 1140-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (same).
172. See Green v. Hocking, 792 F. Supp. 1064, 1065-66 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (applying
congressional intent over literal reading of FDCPA definition); Mertes v. Devitt, 734 F. Supp.
872, 874 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (finding support in legislative history for conclusion that attorney
not debt collector). The Green case was decided nine days after Scott. Indeed, the Green opinion
accepts the distinction as to Crossley that Jones advanced. Green, 792 F. Supp. at 1065. The
Green court also suggested that the FDCPA may violate the principle of separation of powers
if it were to be applied to attorneys. Id. at 1066 n.4.
173. Scott, 964 F.2d at 317.
174. See Mertes, 734 F. Supp. at 874 (holding one percent of income from debt collection
activities not "regular" within meaning of FDCPA).
175. See id. (holding two collection matters over two years not "regular" within meaning
of FDCPA).
176. See Stojanovski v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D. Mich.
1992) (holding volume proper measure).

